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A HEALTH CARE WORKER'S DUTY TO UNDERGO ROUTINE TESTING FOR
HIV/AIDS AND TO DISCLOSE POSITIVE RESULTS TO PATIENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
During the last year, 44,714 new cases of Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) were reported to the Centers for Disease Control
(CDC),' bringing the total number of reported AIDS cases to 191,601.
That total includes 6,438 health care workers (HCWs)l with AIDS as
of March 31, 1991.4 Significantly, however, the number of HCWs in-
fected with the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) which causes
AIDS is unknownA The above statistics reflect only those HCWs who
Copyright 1992, by LOISiANA LAW REvIEw.
1. These numbers reflect reports for the year ending August, 1991. U.S. AIDS Cases
Reported Through August 1991, HIV/AIDS Surveillance Report (Division of HIV/AIDS,
U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Atlanta, Ga.), Sept. 1991, at 1, 5 [hereinafter
Surveillance- Report). Estimates indicate that approximately 70% to 90% of AIDS cases
nationwide are reported to the CDC. Carol Ciesielski, M.D. et al., Dentists, Allied
Professionals With Aids, 122 JADA 42, 43 (1991).
2. Surveillance Report, supra note 1.
3. Throughout this comment "health care provider," "health care worker," or
"doctor" may be used to refer to persons in the same group. The CDC defines health
care workers as "persons, including students and trainees, whose activities involve contact
with patients or with blood or other body fluids from patients in a health care setting."
Recommendations for Prevention of HIV Transmission in Health-Care Settings, Morbidity
& Mortality Weekly Report (Ctrs. for Disease Control, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human
Servs., Atlanta, Ga.), Aug. 21, 1987 (Supp.), at 2S, 3S (hereinafter Recommendations).
4. Ciesielski, M.D. et al., supra note 1. at 42.
As of March 14, 1988, a total of 55,315 adults with AIDS had been reported
to CDC. Occupational information was available for 47,532 of these persons,
2,586 (5.4%) of whom were classified as health-care workers. A similar pro-
portion (5.7%) of the U.S. labor force was employed in health services.
Update: Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome and Human Immunodeficiency Virus In-
fection Among Health-Care Workers, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (Ctrs. for
Disease Control, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Atlanta, Ga.), April 22, 1988,
at 229 (footnote omitted) [hereinafter Updatel.
5. Out of the 168,913 reported cases of U.S. adults with AIDS, occupational in-
formation was available for 135,617 (80%).. Of those, 6,436 (4.8%) were HCWs, of whom
171 were dental workers. Approximately 70% of the HCWs reported to have AIDS have
died. Out of the 171 dental workers included in that number, 120 have died. It is not
known how many of the remaining 51 dental workers are still practicing. Ciesielski, supra
note 1, at 42-43.
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
have actually developed AIDS and do not reflect the number of HCWs
carrying and capable of transmitting HIV.6
On July 27, 1990, the CDC published news of its first reported
case of possible HIV transmission from a HCW to a patient.' A Florida
dentist is believed to have infected Kimberly Bergalis and at least two
other patients with HIV.8 As a result, the Kimberly Bergalis Patient and
Health Provider Protection Act of 1991 was introduced in Congress.
Should the Act pass, it will:
1) prohibit a HCW infected with HIV from providing specified
medical and dental procedures "on the basis that performing
the procedure on an individual would pose a risk of the trans-
mission of the disease from the [HCWJ to the individual;"' 0
2) require any HCW who performs such procedures to undergo
testing for HIV/AIDS as frequently as the Secretary of the
Public Health Service deems necessary;" and,
3) prohibit any HCW, who, through testing is discovered to be
infected with HIV, from performing the procedures described
in section (a)(2), except where the provider:
(i) informs the patient involved that the provider has the
disease;
(ii) informs the patient of the risk posed by the disease in
the context of the procedure; and
(iii) obtains the written consent of the patient for the provider
to perform the procedure notwithstanding such risk;"
After its proposal, the bill was submitted to the Energy and Commerce
Committee where it currently remains. 3 However, in reaction to a pro-
posal by Senator Jesse Helms to make it a federal crime for a HCW
to perform high-risk procedures without disclosing that he was HIV
6. See infra section 2.
7. Possible Transmission of Human immunodeficiency Virus to a Patient During
an Invasive Dental Procedure, Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (Ctrs. for Disease
Control, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Atlanta, Ga.), July 27, 1990, at 489
[hereinafter Possible Transmission].
8. Update, supra note 4.
9. H.R. 2788, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
10. Section 2648A(a)(2) of the Public Health Service Act proposed by H.R. 2788,
"To Amend Title XXVI of the Public Health Service Act to provide for the establishment
of protections against certain communicable diseases for both health care providers and
the patients of such providers, and to provide for certain forms of assistance for such
providers and patients."
11. Sections 2648A(b)(l)(A) and (B) of the Public Health Service Act proposed by
H.R. 2788.
12. Sections 2648A(b)(2)(A)(i)-(iii) of the Public Health Service Act proposed by H.R.
2788.
13. H.R. 2788, 2 Topical Law Reports (CCH) 1 28,318 (July 3, 1991).
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positive, the House and Senate approved a compromise that requires
states to adopt federal guidelines which provide that HCWs who perform
invasive procedures should be tested for AIDS, should avoid risky pro-
cedures except when life or limb is in danger, and should inform patients
if they are infected.' 4 Though this is a step in the right direction,
guidelines do not fill the role of mandatory requirements.
If Congress decides not to require mandatory testing of HCWs, that
will not do away with the issue. The Kimberly Bergalis Act brought
national attention to the risk of HCW-to-patient transmission. As a
result of Kimberly's infection, the risk of HCW-to-patient transmission
has become a reality to the nation rather than merely a theoretical
possibility, 5 and there is an increased awareness of the serious conse-
quences which can result from HIV infected HCWs performing invasive
procedures.
The purpose of this comment is to analyze whether HCWs infected
with HIV have a duty under tort law to disclose that information to
their patients. Further, this comment will address whether such a duty
to disclose encompasses a duty of HCWs to undergo routine testing for
HIV in order to be able to make such a disclosure. 6 After determining
that the benefits involved in imposing a duty to test and to disclose
far outweigh the costs of imposing such a duty, this comment will
conclude by finding that a duty to disclose which encompasses the duty
to test even if Congress does not require mandatory testing does in fact
exist. 17
First, this comment will describe the AIDS disease and its history
and its pathology in Section II. Section III will focus on the health
care industry's reaction to AIDS. In Section IV, this comment will
analyze a tort imposed duty to test and disclose. In Sections V and VI,
this comment will describe the need for the duty and will balance the
costs and benefits of such a duty. Finally, Section VII will address the
scope of such a duty, and Section VIII will propose ways of reducing
the negative impact of such a duty on HCWs.
14. Compromise Measure Bars Spread of AIDS by Doctors, Morning Advocate (Baton
Rouge, La.), Oct. 4, 1991, at 7A.
15. The primary risk of transmission occurs when a HCW injures himself during a
procedure (usually on a sharp object, such as bone or a surgical instrument) which causes
him to bleed into the operative field. See infra text accompanying notes 34-37.
16. A full analysis of the constitutional issues involved in mandatory testing and
disclosure is beyond the scope of this article. For information on this topic, see The
Constitutional Implications of Mandatory AIDS Testing in Health Care Industry, 17 Sw.
U. L. Rev. 787 (1988).
17. For an opposing view on the subject, see Larry Gostin, Hospitals, Health Care
Professionals, and AIDS: The "Right to Know" the Health Status of Professionals and
Patients, 48 Md. L. Rev. 12 (1989).
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II. THE DISEASE
A. Description and History
Perhaps the easiest way to focus on the various stages of the AIDS
disease is to think of them as three levels of a pyramid."8 The bottom
level, the largest, represents those persons infected with HIV, the re-
trovirus which causes AIDS. 9 Individuals at this stage would be sero-
positive (i.e., HIV blood test results would be positive), but they would
not have any symptoms generally associated with AIDS and would
probably not be aware of their disease without testing.20 The great
majority of these persons will develop AIDS. 2
The middle level of the pyramid would represent those persons with
Aids Related Complex (ARC). ARC patients have symptoms such as
"enlarged lymph nodes, shingles, weight loss, persistent fever, night
sweats, persistent dry cough or diarrhea and compromised immune func-
tion." 2  As with seropositive patients, all ARC patients will not nec-
essarily develop AIDS, but the majority will. 23
The top level of the pyramid would represent patients who meet
the definition of AIDS because they are suffering from one or more
of the opportunistic diseases traditionally associated with AIDS. These
include: opportunistic infection, 4 Kaposi's sarcoma,25 non-Hodgkin's
lymphoma of high grade pathogenicity, or, in children under age thirteen,
a lymphocytic (white blood cell) infiltrative process in the lung. 26 One
suffering from AIDS is more contagious than one only HIV infected.27
AIDS has no known cure, and the great majority of individuals with
AIDS will die.2"
18. This depiction is commonly used to describe the disease.
19. Rossi v. Estate of Almaraz, Nos. 90344028, CL123396 (Md. Cir. Ct. May 23,
1991) (1991 WL 166924).
20. Id.
21. David Bell, M.D. et al., Surgical Practice in Hospitals: HIV and the Surgical
Team, American College of Surgeons Bulletin, July 1990, at 12.
22. Comment, Hospitals and AIDS Discrimination: Applicability of Federal Discrim-
ination Laws to HCW and Staff Physicians, 6 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 193, 196-
97 n.18 (1990) (citing Arthur Leonard, AIDS and Employment Law Revisited, 14 Hofstra
L. Rev. 11, 18 n.38 (1985)).
23. Id.
24. Infection caused by an organism that does not usually cause disease.
25. A malignant skin lesion that is normally not found in young individuals.
26. Marc Sicklick, M.D. & Ayre Rubinstein, M.D., A Medical Review of AIDS, 14
Hofstra L. Rev. 5 (1985) (citing Selik et al., Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
(AIDS) Trends in the United States, 1978-1982, 76 Am. J. Med. 493, 499 (1984)).
27. Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr. at Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251, 1267 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991).
28. Bell, M.D. et al., supra note 21, at 12.
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The first cases of AIDS in the United States were reported by CDC
in 1981, just ten years ago.29 In 1984, scientists isolated the HIV. Blood
screening tests for the presence of HIV became available in 1985. This
led to the realization that there are at least two latency periods involved
in the progression of HIV. The first is the period of time between actual
infection with HiV and the time when a person could test positively
for the antibody. In ninety-five percent of cases, antibody tests will be
positive within six months of the date of transmission of (i.e., infection
with) the virus.3 0 Thus, there is a "window" in which a person may
be infected with HIV but have no way of knowing it. The second latency
period occurs between the time when a person is HIV positive and the
time he develops AIDS symptoms. This period is prolonged, the mean
latency period between infection with the virus and the onset of AIDS
being in excess of five years.'
Thus, a person infected with HIV may have a false sense of security
and continue to fully function for years before realizing that he or she
is capable of infecting others. In fact, estimates show that only twelve
percent of people infected with HIV know they are carrying the virus.3"
As mentioned previously, information is not available concerning the
number of HCWs infected with HIV who have not yet developed AIDS. 3
B. Modes of Transmission
It is now widely known that HIV may be transmitted by: sexual
intercourse; parenteral procedures (e.g., injection or other invasive pro-
cedure breaking the skin34 which makes transmission prevalent among
intravenous drug users who share syringes); receipt of donations of
blood," semen, breast milk, organs or other human tissue; and child
birth or breast feeding.
29. Rossi v. Estate of Almaraz, Nos. 90344028, CL123396 (Md. Cir. Ct. May 23,
1991) (1991 WL 166924) (citing Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (Ctrs. for Disease
Control, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Atlanta, Ga.) June 5, 1981 and July
4, 1981).
30. Rossi, 1991 WL 166924 (citing Horsburgh et al., Duration of Human Immu.
nodeficiency Virus Infection Before Detection of Antibody, The Lancet, September 16,
1989, at 637-40).
31. Estate of Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1267.
32. Panel Cites Apathy to AIDS Crisis, State Times (Baton Rouge, La.). September
25, 1991 at IA, 6A (relying on the Ctrs. for Disease Control as authority).
33. See supra text accompanying note 6.
34. Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr. at Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251, 1267 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991).
35. Estimates reveal that one in 40,000 units of blood having been screened as negative
for HIV antibody may nevertheless transmit HIV. Bell, M.D. et al., supra note 21, at
9 (relying on Cohen et al., Transmission of Retrovirus by Transfusion of Screened Blood
in Patients Undergoing Cardiac Surgery, N. Engl. J. Med. 320:1172-6 (1989), and Busch
et al., Risk Associated With Transfusion of HIV-Antibody-Negative Blood, N. Eng]. J.
Med. 322:850-1 (1990)).
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The health care setting thus poses a risk of transmission between
a HCW and a patient primarily through the possibility of contact between
one party's skin36 or mucous membrane and the other's blood, tissue,
semen, vaginal secretions, or other blood contaminated body fluids when
a HCW is injured by a sharp instrument during an invasive procedure.37
Ill. THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY'S REACTION TO AIDS
A. Precautions Taken
No doubt the AIDS epidemic has greatly impacted the health care
industry. A simple visit to the dentist will reveal the extensive measures
which the profession has been forced to adopt in order to protect against
transmission of the disease. Face shields and gloves are two of the more
visible precautions that the health care industry has had to incorporate
into the practice of medicine. The CDC has recommended detailed
guidelines, including: that special precautions be taken prior to mouth-
to-mouth resuscitation; that all HCWs wear gloves for contact with oral
mucous membranes of all patients; that gloves be changed between each
patient; and that HCWs take precautions to prevent injuries caused by
needles, scalpels and other instruments or surgical devices during pro-
cedures."
B. Focus on Patient-to-HCW Transmission
Understandably, the health care industry has been primarily con-
cerned with the transmission of HIV from a patient to a HCW1 9 Much
of the commentary written on the subject stresses the risk of HCWs
contracting HIV from their patients; the risk of transmission occurring
in the opposite direction (i.e., from HCW to patient) has received little
attention from the health care industry or anyone else for that matter.
A quote from one doctor illustrates this:
IT]he normal practice of a physician is unlikely to expose a
patient to the doctor's blood. The doctor is more likely to be
36. This is especially so "if the exposed skin is chapped, abraded, or afflicted with
dermatitis, or if the contact is prolonged or involves an extensive area." Bell. M.D. et
al., supra note 21, at 7.
37. This risk will be discussed more fully later in this article. See infra text accom-
panying notes 131-33.
38. Bell, M.D. et al., supra note 21, at 13-14.
39. Generally, however, precautions which will reduce the risk for the doctor will
also reduce the risk for the patient. "The use of gloves to prevent blood contact with
hands should reduce the risk of HIV infection, as well as protect the patient from
infections that are potentially transmissible from the HCW." Bell, M.D. ct al., supra
note 21, at 14.
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exposed to the patient's body fluids than vice versa. To imply
that the usual practice of medicine would infect patients may
be close to suggesting that AIDS can be transmitted by casual
contact. 40
However, that author narrowly defines "usual practice of medicine"
since he goes on to say that "[tihe situation may be somewhat different
in the case of a surgeon, who may suffer a cut or puncture that could
then drop blood into the operative field. ' 41 Statitistics suggest that a
surgeon sustains a significant cut in one in forty cases. 2 Only anecdotal
information is available regarding the risk of transmission from physician
to patient." 3
. Another doctor confirms that little attention has been given to the
problem of physician-to-patient transmission: "Since it is unknown how
often patients undergoing invasive procedures are exposed to the blood
of HCWs, the risk of HIV transmission from an infected HCW to a
patient during an invasive procedure cannot be determined."" Doctors
at Johns Hopkins University School of Medicine concur: "We conclude
that the [HIV] epidemic has a major impact on emergency services and
that strategies need to be developed for appropriate use of emergency
resources and also for maximizing provider protection.145
C. Testing of Hospitalized Patients
An additional reaction by the medical industry to the AIDS epidemic
has been its desire to test patients for HIV prior to treating them.4 In
fact, the CDC has recommended in a draft report that all hospitalized
patients be tested during their treatment.' A CDC spokesman tried to
placate potential patients by assuring them that "[t]his really is directed
40. Letter from Hacib Aoun, M.D., in 322 New Engi. J. Med. 1154, 1156 (1990).
41. Id.
42. Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr. at Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251, 1279 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991) (citing Larry Gostin, Hospitals, Health Care Professionals,
and AIDS: The "Right to Know" the Health Status of Professionals and Patients, 48
Md. L. Rev. 12 (1989)).
43. Id.
44. Bell, M.D. et al., supra note 21, at 9.
45. Gabor Kelen, M.D. et al., Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection in Emergency
Department Patients, Epidemiology, Clinical Presentations, and Risk to Health Care
Workers: The Johns Hopkins Experience, 262 JAMA 516 (1989) (emphasis added).
46. Despite the apparent focus on protecting HCWs from HIV-infected patients, a
recent survey did reveal that a substantial majority of physicians nevertheless feel a
professional responsibility to care for HIV-infected patients if it is within their realm of
competence to do so. John Rizzo et al., Physician Contact With and Attitudes Toward
HIV-Seropositive Patients, 28 Med. Care 251, 259 (1990).
47. Wider AIDS Testing Plan is Proposed, State Times (Baton Rouge, La.), September
19, 1991, at IA.
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at testing patients for the patients' own benefit, rather than protecting
health care workers, . . It's so patients are better managed, and their
risks are known."'" If implemented, this testing would be added to the
existing recommendations by CDC that "universal precautions," in-
volving a presumption that all blood and certain body fluids of all
patients are HIV-seropositive, be taken to control the spread of infec-
tion. 49
D. First Case of HCW-to-Patient Transmission
With the first report of HCW-to-patient transmission of HIV in the
Kimberly Bergalis case, some attention has turned to the problem of
HIV-infected HCWs transmitting the virus to patients. The CDC pub-
lished recommendations for preventing transmission of AIDS (and Hep-
atitis B) from HCWs to patients during "Exposure-Prone Invasive
Procedures.''" However, the current CDC recommendations fall short
of those proposed in the Kimberly Bergalis Act, and:
1) merely provide for after-the-fact procedures, suggesting that
"[i]f an incident occurs during an invasive procedure that results
in exposure of a patient to the blood of a HCW, the patient
should be informed of the incident, and previous recommen-
48. Id. In a recent case on this topic, a Pennsylvania court held that an unauthorized
AIDS test performed on a patient's blood sample which had been relinquished by the
patient to the doctor was insufficient to support a claim for invasion of privacy. Doe v.
Dyer-Goode, 566 A.2d 889 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
49. Bell, M.D. et al., supra note 21, at 10.
50. The introduction to these guidelines reads as follows:
The recommendations outlined in this document are based on the following
considerations:
- infected HCWs who adhere to universal precautions and who do not
perform invasive procedures pose no risk for transmitting HIV or [Hep-
atitis B] to patients.
- infected HCWs who adhere to universal precautions and who perform
certain exposure-prone procedures ... pose a small risk for transmitting
[Hepatitis Bj to patients.
- HIV is transmitted much less readily than (Hepatitis B].
In the interim, until further data are available, additional precautions are prudent
to prevent HIV and [Hepatitis B] transmission during procedures that have been
linked to HCW-to-patient [Hepatitis B] transmission or that are considered
exposure.prone.
Recommendations for Preventing Transmission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus and
Hepatitis B Virus to Patients During Exposure-Prone Invasive Procedures, Morbidity and
Mortality Weekly Report (Ctrs. for Disease Control, U.S. Dep't of Health and Human
Servs., Atlanta, Ga.) July 12, 1991, at I (citation omitted) [hereinafter Recommendations].
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dations for management of such exposures should be fol-
lowed,"'" and
2) specifically reject mandatory testing of HCWs by stating:
Mandatory testing of HCWs for HIV antibody . .. is not
recommended. The current assessment of the risk that in-
fected HCWs will transmit HIV ... to patients during
exposure-prone procedures does not support the diversion
of resources that would be required to implement man-
datory 'testing programs. Compliance by HCWs with re-
commendations can be increased through education, training,
and appropriate confidentiality safeguards."
However, the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the Amer-
ican Medical Association has recognized a duty on the part of HCWs
to disclose their HIV-infection, and even goes so far as to suggest that
patient consent following such disclosure is not enough:
[T]he Council believes that if a risk of transmission of an
infectious disease from a physician to a patient exists, disclosure.
of that risk to patients is not enough; patients are entitled to
expect that their physicians will not increase their exposure to
the risk of contracting an infectious disease, even minimally. If
no risk exists, disclosure of the physicians' medical condition to
his or her patients will serve no rational purpose; if a risk does
exist, the physician should not engage in the activity."
This is the strongest current recommendation by a medical authority,
but it has been criticized.
Those recommendations lend themselves to arbitrary restrictions
on [HCWs] and are stiffer than the policies implemented to
protect against other risks (such as hepatitis) that patients face
in hospitals.
Because of the public fears stirred up by [the Florida dentist)
report, some will propose testing all [HCWs] for HIV. The best
scientific information at hand does not warrant HIV screening
51. Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr. at Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251, 1265 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991) (citing Ctrs. for Disease Control, Recommendations for Pre-
venting Transmission of Infection with Human T-Lymphotropic Virus Type IIl/Lym-
phadenopathy-Associated Virus during Invasive Procedures, 35 Morbidity and Mortality
Weekly Report 221m23 (1986)).
52. The recommendations describe "exposure-prone" procedures as those which have
been linked to the transmission of Hepatitis B from HCWs to patients even when the
universal precautions had been taken. These include: "certain oral, cardiothoracic, co-
lorectal ... and obstetric/gynecologic procedures." Recommendations, supra note 50, at
4, 6 (citations omitted).
53. Estate of Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1259 (emphasis added).
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of [HCWs], however, and such screening could be justified only
if the risk of transmission from JHCWJ to patient were found
to be meaningful....
... ITihere is reason to recommend preventive and protec-
tive measures to be followed by a worker with a transmissible
illness, but there is no reason for the removal of infected workers
from patient care, unless they fail to comply with the preventive
guidelines and barrier precautions.5 '
Thus, no medical authority has mandated routine HIV testing for HCWs,
and it does not appear likely that any will. HCWs would be faced with
the inconvenience of routine testing, and those who were HIV-positive
would have to disclose that information to patients. As a result, many
HCWs may lose their livelihood. Additionally, the first death caused
by HCW-to-patient transmission has apparently not even elevated the
risk to the level of "meaningful." Therefore, waiting for the medical
profession to decide that HCWs need to be tested is similar to relying
on the fox to guard the henhouse.
Although the medical profession itself is not eager to require testing
of its members, perhaps HCWs nevertheless have a duty in tort law to
disclose their HIV-infection to patients and to undergo routine testing
in order to facilitate that disclosure.
IV. ANALYSIS OF A TORT LAW IMPOSED DUTY TO TEST AND DISCLOSE
Potential tort liability exists for an HCW infected with HIV who
performs invasive procedures on a patient without disclosing his infec-
tion. This liability could arise from a patient's claims of battery, general
negligence, or negligence based on a lack of informed consent.
A. Battery
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Caudle v. Betts defined battery as
"[a] harmful or offensive contact with a person, resulting from an act
intended to cause him to suffer such a contact .... I"" Thus, one does
not have to intend, or be substantially certain, that the offensive contact
will cause harm in order to have committed a battery. He need only
intend to make the offensive contact in order to be liable for all
consequences of that contact whether or not those consequences are
reasonably foreseeable. 56
54. Letter from Hacib Aoun and Patricia Aoun, M.D., in 324 New Engl. J. Med.
265, 266 (1991).
55. Caudle v. Betts, 512 So. 2d 389 (La. 1987).
56. Id. at 392.
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Thus, when an HIV-infected HCW performs an invasive procedure
on a patient without disclosing his condition, he is no doubt offensively
contacting the patient without the patient's consent and is therefore
committing a battery." A HCW who was not aware of his HIV-infection
at the time he made the contact, however, would lack the requisite
intent to inflict an offensive contact and could probably not be found
to have committed a battery. Some dispute may arise as to whether the
contact would be offensive if no accident occurs during the procedure
which would expose the patient to the blood of the HCW. However,
given the burdensome consequences which follow such an accident even
if the patient does not subsequently contract HIV,5a a reasonable person
would likely find the contact offensive for the simple fact that it exposes
him to a risk of such a dreadful outcome.
Based on this analysis, it appears that a patient would have a strong
claim against an HIV-infected HCW for battery. The fact that battery
is an intentional tort raises important issues which are usually not present
in other medical malpractice claims. "Universally, harmful conduct is
considered more reprehensible if intentional. ' " 9 For example, it is against
public policy for liability insurance to cover the intentional acts of the
insured. Thus, a HCW found liable for battery would have no assistance
in carrying the burden of the judgment.
B. General Negligence
The same patient may be able to establish a cause of action in
negligence by proving that: 1) the performance of an invasive procedure
by an HIV-infected HCW was the cause-in-fact of the patient subse-
quently contracting the virus; 2) the HCW owed a duty to the patient
to act reasonably to avoid transmitting the virus to the patient; and 3)
the HCW breached that duty. In order to establish the cause-in-fact
element, one would need to determine whether any accidents occurred
during the procedure which could have resulted in the HCW's blood
coming into contact with the patient's body fluids. In addition, experts
could compare DNA taken from blood samples to determine whether
the patient and the HCW are infected with the same strain of the virus.
That, along with studies of the patient's sexual history and the HIV
status of his partners, can lead to highly reliable conclusions as to
whether the HCW did in fact transmit the virus to the patient! 0
57. Cf. Ashcraft v. King, 278 Cal. Rptr. 900, 903-04 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) where
an appellate court held that a surgeon committed battery if the patient's consent to surgery
was conditioned on use of only family-donated blood, and patient was harmed by the
surgeon intentionally violating that condition.
58. See infra text accompanying notes 144-48.
59. Bazley v. Tortorich, 397 So. 2d 475, 477 (La. 1981).
60. See supra note 7.
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Once causation is established, the question arises whether the HCW
owed a duty to the patient to act reasonably to avoid transmitting the
virus to the patient. Surely such a duty exists. Arguably two individuals
not in the HCW-patient relationship owe this duty to one another. An
HCW owes a fiduciary duty to his patient because the relationship is
one of trust. In addition, the medical industry is responsible for the
spread of disease, and its members have voluntarily assumed the duty
to guard the health care of their patients. 61
Once a duty is established, the next inquiry is whether the HCW
breached his or her duty to act reasonably to avoid transmitting HIV
to his or her patient by performing the invasive procedure. Whether
the HCW acted reasonably must be considered objectively in light of
the scientific knowledge and relevant circumstances at the time the alleged
breach occurred.6 Therefore, perhaps prior to the Kimberly Bergalis
case, following the CDC recommendations concerning "universal pre-
cautions" would have been sufficient to fulfill the duty of acting rea-
sonably. However, the risk of HCW-to-patient transmission of HIV is
now a real risk-it has happened at least once. In addition, the medical
industry is acutely aware that HCWs are at risk of being infected by
their patients. 63 The logical conclusion to draw from these facts is that
HIV was first transmitted from patients to HCWs and will next be
increasingly transmitted from HCWs back to patients. Thus, the risk
of HCW-to-patient transmission of HIV is now foreseeable. Such fo-
reseeability should, therefore, give rise to more caution being taken by
HIV-infected HCWs before their actions reach the level of "reasonable."
Application of the Learned Hand Formula provides one method of
determining whether performing invasive procedures would be reasonable
action. The likelihood of an HIV-infected HCW transmitting HIV to a
particular patient during an invasive procedure is at least .0025% based
on current available data. 64 However, the number of HCWs infected
with HIV is unknown, making it impossible to determine the likelihood
that a patient would be exposed to the blood of an HIV-infected HCW.
The severity of the harm which would result is extremely high since the
majority of those infected with HIV will contract AIDS, and the majority
of those will die. Further, those who do not contract HIV, but who
are exposed to the blood of a HCW during surgery, will have to undergo
61. Rajnowski v. St. Patrick's Hosp., 1990 La. Lexis 2973 (La. 1990) (Dennis, J.,
concurring in denial of reh'g).
62. Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr. at Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251, 1267 n.9 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991).
63. Surveillance Report, supra note 1, at 16.
64. See infra text accompanying note 81. Note that this probability is based on current
available data which includes only the number of HCWs suffering from AIDS and does
not include the number of HCWs infected with HIV.
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extensive testing for years and make serious lifestyle adjustments. 6' Fi-
nally, the cost of avoidance is not insignificant. Even though the cost
of having a healthy HCW perform the invasive procedure is low, the
cumulative cost of such avoidance would be higher since HIV-infected
HCWs would basically have to give up their careers.M Since the likelihood
of harm is unknown, the risk is extremely high, and the cost of avoidance
is moderate, a HCW may be required to err on the side of caution.
Thus, an HIV-infected HCW who performs invasive procedures may be
negligent for failing to have a HCW who does not pose a risk to the
patient's health perform the procedure.
Courts outside of Louisiana have addressed negligence with respect
to the transmission of AIDS. In Rossi v. Estate of Almaraz,6' the issue
was whether a woman who had a benign mass removed from her breast
by a physician who died of AIDS just over a year after performing the
surgery had an action against the physician's estate and the hospital
who employed him for fear of contracting AIDS. The plaintiff's original
complaint included an allegation of lack of informed consent, but that
allegation was amended to one of straight negligence, alleging that the
physician operated on the plaintiff while knowing that he had AIDS.6'
The defendants moved for dismissal, so the issue before the court was
whether the plaintiff had alleged a compensable injury, assuming all of
the allegations were true. The plaintiff alleged that her damages included
her "daily fear of having been exposed to the risk of the disease" and
that she "has been required to undergo invasive AIDS testing." 69 The
Rossi court cited Burk v. Sage Products' which had previously addressed
the issue.
In Burk, a needle protruding from a disposal container stuck a
paramedic. While he alleged that there were several patients with AIDS
on the hospital floor where the accident occurred, he was unable to
show that the needle which pricked him had actually been used on an
AIDS patient. The patient tested HIV seronegative five times in just
over a one year period, but alleged the fear of contracting AIDS as an
injury. The Burk court acknowledged that fear of contracting a disease
was a compensable injury in earlier cases, but denied plaintiff's action
using the following reasoning. In those cases which allowed recovery
65. They are forced to undergo periodic testing for at least one year and suffer
extreme anxiety and mental anguish awaiting the test results; they are counselled concerning
major lifestyle changes regarding sexual practices and conceiving children.
66. See infra text accompanying note 149.
67. Nos. 90344028, CL123396 (Md. Cir. Ct. May 23, 1991) (1991 WL 166924).
68. The other three allegations included intentional infliction of emotional distress,
breach of fiduciary duty, and battery. Id.
69. Id.
70. 747 F. Supp. 285 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
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for fear of disease, the plaintiffs were faced only with the question of
whether they would contract the disease in the future; they already knew
they had been exposed to the disease. On the other hand, the plaintiff
in the Burk case did face the additional question of whether he had,
in fact, been exposed to the AIDS virus in the first place." Thus, the
plaintiff's injury in Burk was really fear of initial exposure to AIDS
which is not compensable, rather than fear of contracting AIDS due to
exposure, which is compensable.72
The Rossi court analogized to Burk and found that Mrs. Rossi was
unable to allege sufficient facts to prove that she was in fact exposed
to AIDS in the first place and dismissed her complaint. The Rossi court
reasoned: "Because there are no reported cases of transmission of AIDS
from a surgeon to a patient, such transmission is only a theoretical
possibility when proper barrier techniques are employed."" .The 'court
noted that the plaintiff had not alleged that the doctor failed to use
protective barriers nor that any incident occurred which would have
allowed Dr. Almaraz's blood to enter her body. The court concluded:
"Under the principles of Burk, without proof of exposure, that is,
without a positive HIV test, the plaintiff cannot present compensable
damages. 7 4
Thus, the Rossi court appears to require a plaintiff to test positively
for HIV prior to having a claim for fear of contracting AIDS. That is
absurd. A plaintiff who tests positively for HIV would not need to rely
on fear of contracting AIDS in order to establish a compensable injury.
Such a patient would have extensive damages, such as loss of consortium
and affliction with an incurable disease to name only a few. In addition,
the court placed the burden on the plaintiff to prove accidents during
surgery which could have resulted in exposure. Surely that burden cannot
be carried by a layperson who is usually unconscious during the time
when any such accident might occur. Finally, the court in Rossi placed
great emphasis on the fact that there had been no case of transmission
of AIDS from HCW-to-patient. Thus, had the case been decided two
months later, after the first such case was discovered, would the outcome
have been different?
C. Medical Informed Consent
Perhaps a patient's strongest claim in. virtually any jurisdiction would
be one based on lack of informed consent. A patient has a cause of
71. Id. at 287. In addition, the negative test results appeared to establish a medical
fact that he would not develop AIDS. Id. at 288.
72. Id. at 288.
73. Rossi, 1991 WL 166924.
74. Id.
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action in negligence for lack of informed consent against a physician
who has performed a procedure to which the patient has consented but
who has failed to disclose to the patient certain risks involved in the
procedure." Therefore, a physician infected with HIV who performs an
invasive procedure on a patient without informing the patient of his
condition probably has not obtained the patient's informed consent and
may be liable for any damages caused the patient as a result of this
negligence. 6
1. Louisiana Law
Louisiana has both a legislative and jurisprudential basis for a cause
of action arising from lack of medical informed consent.
a. Louisiana Legislation
The Louisiana Legislature passed the Uniform Consent Law in 1975
to define consent to medical treatment. The statute provides in pertinent
part:
A. Notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, written
consent to medical treatment means a consent in writing to any
medical or surgical procedure or course of procedures which (a)
sets forth in general terms the nature and purpose of the pro-
cedure or procedures, together with the known risks, if any, of
death, brain damage, quadriplegia, paraplegia, the loss or loss
of function of any organ or limb, or disfiguring scars associated
with such procedure or procedures .... 77
According to the requirements of this statute, must a doctor's HIV
infection be disclosed to a patient prior to performing an invasive
procedure in order for the doctor to obtain informed consent? Arguably
it does, based on the following analysis. First of all, the HCW who
performs an invasive procedure on a patient is within the purview of
the statutory requirements because the statute pertains to consent for
"any medical or surgical procedure or course of procedures." The statute
requires that, for informed consent to be obtained, "the known risks,
if any, of death ... associated with such procedure" must be set forth
for the patient in general terms. This means that any known risk must
be disclosed to the patient. The legislature could have qualified the word
"any" with words like material, substantial or significant. Instead, the
75. Neil C. Abramson, Comment, A Right to Privacy Tour de Force into Louisiana
Medical Informed Consent, 51 La. L. Rev. 755, 756 (1991).
76. See Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr. at Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1991) and infra text accompanying notes 104-13.
77. La. R.S. 40:1299.40 (1977 and Supp. 1991).
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legislature has arguably concluded that any risk of death is material
because of the gravity of the potential consequences at stake.7" It is not
uncommon for a doctor to nick or cut himself during an invasive
procedure which may cause him to bleed into the operative field, 9 and,
as was discussed earlier, infection with HIV brings with it a great risk
of death.80 The chance of occurrence of such an injury and transmission
of the infection to the patient is believed to be .0025% (less than one
half of one percent).8 Though this chance may be small when considering
each individual patient, it falls within "the known risks, if any, of death
... associated with such procedure." Therefore, under this statute, a
doctor would have to disclose his HIV-infection to his patient prior to
performing an invasive procedure in order to obtain informed consent.
b. Louisiana Jurisprudence
There is also a jurisprudential basis for a cause of action arising
from lack of medical informed consent in Louisiana. The Louisiana
Supreme Court decisions in LaCaze v. Collie'2 and Hondroulis v.
Schuhmacher3 set forth the medical informed consent doctrine as it
exists in Louisiana. These cases interpret the Uniform Consent Law s4
passed by the Louisiana Legislature in 1975. The Louisiana Supreme
Court in Hondroulis decided that the Uniform Consent Law provided
only the "legislative limits of medical consent" and not the exclusive
means for bringing a cause of action for lack of informed consent in
Louisiana.s Therefore, a cause of action may be brought under the
78. See infra text accompanying notes 86-88 for a discussion of the "materiality" of
the risk which the jurisprudence explains must be present in order for disclosure of the
risk to be required.
79. See supra note 7.
80. See supra text accompanying notes 21-28.
81. This was agreed upon by two experts in Estate of Behringer, and one of the
experts explained:
Whether an injury occurs, whether it occurs within range of the patient's blood,
whether the surgeon's blood makes its way out from beneath two layers of
gloves, and whether there is then a transmission of the surgeon's blood into
the patient's blood, are all independent events that geometrically reduce the
chance of blood-to-blood contact .... [The expert] added that the risk factor
was affected by the nature of the surgery performed, e.g., orthopedic surgeons
or gynecological surgeons operating in some areas by "feel" bear a higher risk
of accident than do surgeons such as ENT specialists.
Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr. at Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251, 1264 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Law Div. 1991).
82. 434 So. 2d 1039 (La. 1983).
83. 553 So. 2d 398 (La. 1988).
84. La. R.S. 40:1299.40 (1977 and Supp. 1991).
85. Neil C. Abramson, Comment, A Right to Privacy Tour de Force into Louisiana
Medical Informed Consent, 51 La. L. Rev. 755 (1991).
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jurisprudence even if the requirements of the Uniform Consent Law are
not met.
The jurisprudential foundation begins with LaCaze which held that
the duty of a physician in obtaining informed consent included the duty
to inform the patient of: 1) the patient's particular condition, 2) the
general nature of the proposed treatment, 3) all "material" risks as-
sociated with the treatment, 4) the likelihood of success, 5) the risks of
refusing the treatment, and 6) the risks and availability of alternative
treatment. "Material risks" were defined as those risks "to which a
reasonable person ... would attach significance in deciding whether or
not to undergo or forego the proposed treatment." 6 The LaCaze court
also applied a'n objective test to determine causation: "whether a rea-
sonable patient in this plaintiff's position would have consented to the
treatment had the material information and risks been disclosed.""7
Finally, as with any other negligence suit, the plaintiff was required to
prove damages. 81 In 1988, the Louisiana Supreme Court in Hondroulis
explained that the "informed consent doctrine is based on the principle
that every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done to his or her own body." 8 9
The Louisiana Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal recently applied this
existing law and rendered a pivotal decision involving the lack of in-
formed consent in Hidding v. Williams!0 In that case, an orthopaedic
surgeon performed a decompressive central laminectomy on a fifty-nine
year old man. As a result of the surgery, the patient's excretory systems
did not function properly; he suffered loss of bowel and bladder control."
Affirming the trial court, the appellate court held that the doctor did
not obtain the patient's informed consent because he failed to disclose
to the patient: 1) that nerve damage was a known risk of the surgery
involved, and 2) that the doctor was suffering from alcohol abuse at
the time of the surgery.
The court applied a two-step analysis in determining whether the
procedure involved a material risk. The first step requires "examination
of the 'incidence of injury/degree of harm' ratio." '92 The court noted
that this step requires expert testimony to ascertain what risks exist and
how likely they are to occur. The second step, taken once this probability
86. Id. at 757 n.12.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So. 2d 398, 411 (La. 1988).
90. 578 So. 2d 1192 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1991).
91. Until his death from an unrelated cause in January, 1990.
92. Hidding v. Williams, 578 So. 2d 1192, 1194 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1991) (citing
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
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of harm is defined and the parameters of the risk are established,
becomes one for the trier of fact who must determine whether a rea-
sonable person in the patient's position would attach significance to the
specific risk.9
The court held that the doctor was negligent in not adequately
informing the patient of the risk of losing bladder and bowel control
since such a loss occurred in I out of 200,000 cases.9 More importantly,
the court also held that the doctor's failure to disclose his chronic
alcohol abuse to the patient and the patient's wife constituted a failure
to obtain informed consent to the surgery. The court reasoned: "Because
this condition creates a material risk associated with the surgeon's ability
to perform, which if disclosed would have obliged the patient to have
elected another course of treatment, the fact-finder's conclusion that
non-disclosure is a violation of the informed consent doctrine is entirely
correct." 91 "[T]his condition presented a material risk to the patient,
the increased potential for injury during surgery, that was not dis-
closed."96 A concurring opinion alleged that the question of injury, i.e.
a cause-in-fact relationship, had been left out of the analysis, making
the majority opinion an automatic imposition of liability when a pro-
fessed and practicing alcoholic operates on any patient. 97
This is the jurisprudential backdrop against which one would analyze
a patient's lack of informed consent cause of action in Louisiana based
on an HCW's performing invasive procedures without disclosing his HIV
infection. No doubt, Hidding takes a step toward requiring that disclo-
sure. In both situations, the undisclosed risk is the doctor's disease.
In Hidding, the court held that the doctor's alcoholism was a material
risk because it presented an "increased potential for injury during sur-
93. Hidding, 578 So. 2d at 1194 (citing Hondroulis, 553 So. 2d at 412).
94. The court noted that the patient had minimal reading skills and the only indication
made to him of this risk was a clause in the medical consent form he signed which listed
one of the risks associated with the procedure as "the loss of or loss of function of
body organs." Hidding, 578 So. 2d at 1195-96.
95. Id. at 1196.
96. Id. at 1198 (emphasis added).
97. Id. at 1198. Two years following the patient's surgery:
[Tihe Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners suspended Dr. Williams'
medical license on charges of "(h]abitual or recurring drunkenness," LSA-R.S.
37:1285(4); "[plrofessional or medical incompetency," 37:1285(12);
"[ulnprofessional conduct," 37:1285(13); "[clontinuing or recurring medical
practice which fails to satisfy the prevailing and usually accepted standards of
medical practice in this state." 37:1285(14); and "[ilnability to practice medicine
... with reasonable skill or safety to patients because of mental illness or
deficiency; physical illness, including but not limited to deterioration through
the aging process or loss of motor skills; and/or, excessive use or abuse of
drugs, including alcohol." 37:1285(25).
Id. at 1196-97.
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gery."" Though no damages were expressly linked to the failure to
disclose alcoholism, the court seems to be implying that, had the doctor
not been handicapped by chronic alcoholism, this surgery probably would
not have been the one in 200,000 to result in the patient's loss of
bladder and bowel control. In other words, the type of potential injury
would have been the same with or without the alcoholism, but the
probability for the patient to be the one in 200,000 was increased by
the doctor's chronic alcoholism. Thus, it appears that the effect on the
doctor's ability to avoid an already existing risk is what made the chronic
alcoholism in Hidding a material risk warranting disclosure.
In the case of a doctor with HIV, there is also an "increased
potential for injury during surgery." However, unlike the doctor in
Hidding, the doctor with HIV has added a "new" injury to the repository
of possible injuries the patient could sustain during the surgery. By
doing so, the doctor has increased the potential for that injury to occur
(i.e., from near zero to .0025%)." Instead of the injury being the
increased chance of an already existing risk occurring-i.e., the alco-
holism causing the surgery in Hidding to be the one in 200,000 to result
in malfunction of excretory systems-the injury here is: 1) the risk of
contracting a contagious disease which causes AIDS and often results
in death, and 2) the risk of having to undergo frequent and traumatic
testing and major life-style changes should the doctor puncture himself
and expose blood into the operative field even if infection does not
occur. 100 Therefore, the HIV infection increases the patient's potential
for injury during surgery because it creates a risk of an entirely separate
injury otherwise not present.
Even though the doctor's HIV infection arguably does not interfere
with the doctor's ability as it did in Hidding, it presents a material risk
because it introduces a risk of a distinct injury-the risk that the patient
will contract the disease from the doctor. Thus, "the increased potential
for injury during surgery" as a result of the doctor's disease arises, in
the case of alcoholism from the effect on ability, and, in the case of
HIV, from the possibility of transmission.
As a result of this analysis, it appears that if a HCW fails to disclose
his HIV infection to his patients prior to performing invasive procedures,
he would be negligent in Louisiana whether one applied Louisiana Re-
vised Statutes 40:1299.40 or Hidding and its supporting line of cases.
2. Other Jurisdictions
Jurisdictions outside of Louisiana have faced the issue of lack of
informed consent with regard to AIDS. In Doe v. Johnston, 10 the Iowa
98. See supra text accompanying note 96.
99. See supra text accompanying note 64.
100. See infra text accompanying notes 144-48.
101. 476 N.W.2d 28 (Iowa 1991).
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Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a doctor's failure to warn
a patient of the risk of contracting AIDS from a blood transfusion,
or, in the alternative, whether failing to advise him that he could self-
donate the necessary blood, was a breach of the standard of medical
care. The court explained the "patient rule" which gives the patient a
right to make an informed decision regarding whether to submit to a
particular medical procedure and places a duty on the doctor to disclose
all material risks involved in the proc;edure. 101 The court held that the
doctor was not negligent, noting that in 1985, there was conflicting
evidence as to materiality of the risk, as well as to the availability of
autologous transfusions (self-donating). Prior to arriving at this conclu-
sion, the court narrowly articulated the issue as follows: "whether, in
February 1985, the risk of contracting AIDS from blood products was
so material, and the use of autologous transfusion so reasonable, that
the doctor was negligent as a matter of law in failing to so advise his
patient."'0 3 Thus, it appears from the qualified wording of the issue
and the dispute over the information regarding AIDS and blood trans-
fusions available in 1985, that the doctor probably would have been
found negligent had the same facts arisen today.
In Estate of Behringer v. Medical Center at Princeton, a Superior
Court of New Jersey recognized a physician's duty to disclose his HIV
seropositive status to patients prior to performing surgery and to inform
them of the risk of a surgical accident in order to obtain informed
consent.' °4 The plaintiff in this case was an ENT surgeon'05 previously
allowed to operate at the defendant-hospital. The surgeon was also
admitted as a patient at the defendant-hospital. While in the hospital
as a patient, the surgeon tested positively for HIV and was diagnosed
with Pneumocystis Carinii Pneumonia (PCP), a combination leading to
the conclusion that he had AIDS. Thereafter, the hospital revoked
plaintiff's surgical privileges. Following his discharge from the hospital,
numerous friends and co-workers called to wish him well. This apparent
breach of confidentiality on the part of the hospital, as well as the
hospital's suspension of his surgical privileges, prompted the plaintiff
to bring an action against the hospital for: 1) breach of the hospital's
and certain employees' duty to maintain confidentiality of his diagnosis
and test results, and 2) a violation of the New Jersey Law Against
Discrimination as a result of defendants' placing conditions on plaintiff's
continued performance of surgical procedures at the medical. center.
102. Id. at 31.
103. Id. at 30.
104. 592 A.2d 1251 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991).
105. In addition to performing ear, nose and throat surgery, he also performed facial
plastic surgery.
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After recognizing its responsibility to "explore[l the competing in-
terests of a surgeon with AIDS, his patients, the hospital at which he
practices and the hospital's medical and dental staff,"'16 the court sum-
marized its holding in pertinent part as follows:
[1] The Medical Center met its burden of establishing that its
policy of temporarily suspending and, thereafter, restricting
plaintiff's surgical privileges was substantially justified by a rea-
sonable probability of harm to [a] patient.
[2] The "risk of harm" to [a] patient includes not only the
actual transmission of HIV from surgeon to patient but the risk
of a surgical accident, i.e., a scalpel cut or needle stick, which
may subject the patient to post-surgery HIV testing.
[31 . .. [Miedical center, as a condition of vacating the tem-
porary suspension of plaintiff's surgical privileges, properly re-
quired plaintiff, as a physician with a positive diagnosis of AIDS,
to secure informed consent from any surgical patients.
[41 The medical center's policy of restricting surgical privileges
of [HCWs] who pose "any risk of HIV transmission to the
patient" was a reasonable exercise of . .. authority ... where
plaintiff was an AIDS-positive surgeon."
Thus, there is at least one court which has recognized a surgeon's duty
to disclose the fact that he has AIDS to his patients prior to operating
in order to obtain informed consent. It should be noted, however, that
the hospital imposed the duty in this case, not the law, and the court
merely approved of that decision because the hospital established that
its actions were "substantially justified by a reasonable probability of
harm to [a] patient." In fact, the court articulated its "growing awareness
that courts should allow hospitals, as long as they proceed fairly, to
run their own business."' 0 8 Thus, we are left with the question of whether
a court would impose a duty to disclose if disclosure was not required
by the hospital.
106. Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr. at Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251, 1254 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991).
107. Id. at 1255 (all emphasis in original omitted) (emphasis added). The court also
held that:
[51 The medical center breached its duty of confidentiality to plaintiff, as a
patient, when it failed to take reasonable precautions regarding plaintiff's medical
records to prevent plaintiff's AIDS diagnosis from becoming a matter of public
knowledge.
[6] Plaintiff, as an AIDS-afflicted surgeon with surgical privileges at the medical
center, was protected by the Law Against Discrimination.
N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 et seq.
108. Id. at 1276 (quoting Nanavati v. Burdette Tomlin Mem. Hosp., 107 N.J. 240,
249-50, 526 A.2d 697 (1987)).
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The opinion includes a review of the hospital's lengthy decision
process. Initially, only the president of the medical center thought that
the plaintiff's surgical privileges should be suspended, and he had no
data to back him up.109 It was this lack of available information about
the possible transmission from a HCW to a patient which kept the other
members of the executive committee of the hospital from initially agree-
ing with him." 0 After a series of meetings where the president and the
hospital's legal counsel expressed concerns about the hospital's reputation
and potential exposure to litigation, the board of trustees of the hospital
voted to require that a special "informed consent form" be presented
to patients about to undergo surgery by HIV-positive surgeons."' In
determining that the hospital's procedure was fair," 2 the court noted
that "[i/f there is to be an ultimate arbiter of whether the patient is
to be treated invasively by an AIDS-positive surgeon, the arbiter will
be the fully-informed patient."" ' 3 Thus, the Behringer court has rec-
ognized that the risk of a physician transmitting AIDS to a patient is
a risk which, if not disclosed to a patient, could result in liability on
the part of the hospital, and, therefore, the hospital was reasonable in
taking the measures it did in order to prevent that exposure. This appears
109. Note: The CDC merely recommends that the decision be made on a case-by-case
basis. Recommendations, supra note 3, at 16S.
110. Estate of Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1257. Note, the date of this decision was about
two months prior to the Kimberly Bergalis case. The court recognized that it was bound
"by the state of medical science at the time of the relevant fact circumstances, not on
future speculation" and that subsequent to trial a case of HCW-to-patient transmission
had been reported. Id. at 1267 n.9.
111. The consent form read as follows:
THE MEDICAL CENTER AT PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY SUPPLEMEN-
TAL CONSENT FOR OPERATIVE AND/OR INVASIVE PROCEDURE
I have on this date executed a consent, which is attached hereto, for (Procedure)
to be performed by Dr. _. In addition, I have also been informed by
Dr. -, that he has a positive blood test indicative of infection with HIV
(Human Immunodeficiency Virus) which is the cause of AIDS. I have also been
informed of the potential risk of transmission of the virus.
(witness) (signature of patient)
Id. at 1258.
112. The court applied the following test to determine whether the hospital wrongfully
discriminated against the plaintiff:
whether the continuation of surgical privileges, which necessarily encompasses
invasive procedures, poses a "reasonable probability of substantial harm" to
others, including co-employees and, more importantly, patients.
In the present case both parties agree that the risk of incident, i.e., transmission
of the HIV virus from physician to patient, is small, but that the risk of injury
from such transmission is high, i.e., death.
Id. at 1276.
113. Id. at 1283 (emphasis added).
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to be a step towards a positive answer to the question of whether a
duty to disclose would be imposed by a court and found to have been
breached if disclosure was not required by the hospital. If no such duty
existed, the court could hardly have been justified in finding reasonable
the hospital's suspension of the doctor's surgical privileges.
3. The Irrational Patient
When considering the requirement that HCWs disclose their HIV
infection to patients in order to obtain informed consent, one cannot
help but wonder whether, given the hysteria which often surrounds AIDS,
a patient could rationally act on such information. Several cases have
addressed this issue in analogous situations and found that the doctor,
nevertheless, has a duty to make the disclosure. In Cowman v. Hornaday,
the Supreme Court of Iowa held that a physician has a duty to disclose
to a patient considering a vasectomy all known material risks of com-
plication inherent in the proposed surgery and that he could not withhold
information on the basis that to disclose it might alarm the patient.""
In Kinikin v. Heupel, the Supreme Court of Minnesota held that a
patient's cancer phobia did not relieve the physician of his duty to warn
her of the risk of skin cancer presented by prophylactic breast surgery.'"
On the other hand, a Louisiana court recognized in Hondroulis v.
Schuhmacher that:
[a] doctor has a "therapeutic privilege" to withhold disclo-
sure of a material risk when the physician reasonably foresees
that disclosure will cause the patient to become ill or emotionally
distraught so as to foreclose a rational decision, complicate or
hinder treatment, or pose psychological damage to the patient.
This privilege must be carefully circumscribed, however, for
otherwise it might devour the disclosure rule itself." 6
Whether to apply such a privilege with respect to the disclosure of a
doctor's HIV infection, however, simply begs the question. If the patient
gets upset and irrational at the prospect of being operated on by a
doctor with HIV, the patient has a simple alternative-have another
doctor without HIV perform the procedure. This is quite different from
cases such as Cowman and Kiniken where the patient would have to
forego the treatment entirely. Therefore, going through the exercise of
determining how a certain patient will react to the information would
be harder in most instances than simply having someone else perform
114. 329 N.W.2d 422, 427 (Iowa 1983).
115. 305 N.W.2d 589, 595 (Minn. 1981).
116. Hondroulis v. Schuhmacher, 553 So. 2d 398, 413 (La. 1988) (citing Canterbury
v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 789 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
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the procedure. Of course, the easiest route from the medical industry's
perspective would be not to deal with the irrational patient at all by
not requiring disclosure. Should the "therapeutic privilege" be conclu-
sively invoked by the medical industry for the "benefit" of us all?
Based on the above analysis of current law in both Louisiana and
other jurisdictions, a HCW has a legal duty in tort law to disclose his
HIV infection to patients prior to performing invasive procedures. In
Louisiana, this duty derives from both legislation (i.e., the Uniform
Consent Law) and jurisprudence, especially Hidding, where a doctor
suffering from chronic alcoholism lacked informed consent because he
did not disclose his condition to the patient prior to performing surgery.
Outside of Louisiana, the Estate of Behringer court has recognized such
a duty by finding that a hospital acted reasonably in order to avoid
liability when it suspended an HIV-infected doctor's surgical privileges
and conditioned future privileges on patients' completing a special con-
sent form which disclosed that the doctor performing the procedure was
HIV positive.
V. NEED FOR THE DUTY TO TEST AND DISCLOSE
There are many compelling reasons to require that a HCW disclose
his or her HIV infection, most of which were addressed by the Estate
of Behringer court in reaching its conclusion. These will be discussed
below along with the need for a corollary duty of HCWs to routinely
test for HIV infection in order to be able to disclose positive results
to their patients.
A. Relative Position of Doctor and Patient
The relative position of a doctor and patient places the patient at
the mercy of the doctor. A doctor owes a fiduciary duty to his patient
because the relationship is one of utmost trust."' No doubt, the eminence
of the medical profession comes in part from society's total dependence
upon members of the health care profession for its health and well-
being. The eminence also finds roots in the power of the profession,
spawned by its knowledge of and control over illnesses and ailments
and often life and death.
Acting for the good of the patient is the most ancient and
universally acknowledged principle in medical ethics .... Every
participant in clinical ethical decisions invokes the good of the
patient to justify his or her moral choice .... The two major
ethical theories vying for dominance in promoting the good of
117. Rajnowski v. St. Patrick's Hosp., 1990 La. Lexis 2973 (1990) (Dennis, J., con-
curring in denial of reh'g).
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the patient are the autonomy of the individual patient and the
social utility and accountability of the physician.'
Consequently, the power which the medical profession has over society
should be wielded with care and concern for the patient.
This disparity between the respective positions of patient and phy-
sician and the almost total control the doctor has over that relationship
imposes a duty upon physicians to take every precaution available to
them in order to protect their patients. Today these precautions should
include routine testing for HIV infection and disclosure of positive results
to patients. Why? Because the doctor is in control. The patient has no
ability to employ "universal precautions" when dealing with doctors.
The patient cannot establish or enforce guidelines which doctors are to
follow during invasive procedures. The patient will probably not even
know when a violation of such guidelines has occurred.
On the other hand, "[t]he doctor is trained to recognize, diagnose,
and avoid contracting the patient's disease .... While secretive patients
may transmit their diseases to unwary doctors, doctors are responsible
for both their own health and the health of their patients."' 19 In addition
to this responsibility for the health of their patients, the medical industry
is responsible for the spread of disease and engages in "lookback"
programs in order to warn third parties associated with the AIDS victims
of the possibility of contracting the disease from the patient. The Estate
of Behringer court recognized: "If a physician has a duty to warn third
parties of the HIV status of patients who may be, for example, sexual
partners of the patient, it could legitimately be argued that the risk of
transmission would similarly require the surgeon to warn his own pa-
tients."12 0
B. The Epidemic Coming "Full Circle"
Among the most troubling reasons that the duty is necessary is the
realization that, as will be explained below, the AIDS epidemic has
come "full circle." There has been great concern and attention given
to the problem of patient-to-HCW transmission of HIV in the medical
industry.' 2' Unfortunately, this focus was justified.'2 However, the trag-
edy of HCWs being stricken with a deadly disease in the pursuit of
helping others has left us with an even bigger and more frightening
concern: HCWs themselves are in a high risk group for contracting
118. Id.
119. Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr. at Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251, 1282 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
120. Fstate of Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1281 n.19.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 39-45.
122. Surveillance Report, supra note 1, at 16.
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HIV. HCWs contracting HIV from their patients is only one phase in
the spread of this undiscriminating virus. The logical consequence of
that phase is the beginning of another phase in the epidemic as the
virus spreads from HCWs back to patients.
The first discovery of a HCW-to-patient transmission in the Kimberly
Bergalis case makes this second phase seem, in hindsight, almost obvious.
Of course, epidemics do not come with written strategies to inform their
victims of the paths they will take. Instead, society and its experts are
left to struggle, using knowledge and resources, to combat the epidemic.
They can do this by placing obstacles in the paths they can foresee that
the disease will take and/or obstacles in the paths they cannot afford
for the disease to take (no matter how unlikely it seems at the time
that the disease would in fact take those paths).
Prior to the Kimberly Bergalis case, transmission of HIV from HCWs
to patients was a path society could not afford for the disease to take.
For if it did, the source of health care would then be paradoxically
transformed into a source of infection, disease and death. Unfortunately,
that risk was not taken seriously, and the HCW-to-patient path was left
unprotected. Now, however, given what we know about the Kimberly
Bergalis case, HCW-to-patient transmission is also a path society can
foresee the disease will take. According to basic negligence principles,
once such a tragedy is foreseeable, duties to prevent the tragedy emerge.
One such duty is that of HCWs to undergo routine testing and disclose
positive results to their patients.
C. Lack of Incentive for Voluntary Disclosure
Still another need for the duty arises from the lack of incentive for
HCWs to voluntarily disclose their diseases. For example, in Estate of
Behringer, the plaintiff's companion indicated that once the surgeon was
diagnosed with AIDS, his relationships with neighbors and friends
changed. "There was less social contact and communication and what
she perceived as a significant diminution in the popularity of plaintiff."'2 3
His practice was even more significantly impacted than his social re-
lationships.
During his short absence from the office (approximately one month),
many of his patients requested transfer of their files or indicated that
they no longer wanted to be treated by the plaintiff. In fact, plaintiff's
companion, at one point instructed the plaintiff's receptionist not to
confirm any information regarding plaintiff's disease and to "instruct
patients that plaintiff did not have AIDS." In addition, within two
months of plaintiff's return to work, three employees left and a re-
123. 592 A.2d at 1256.
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placement employee left the day after she learned that plaintiff had
AIDS. 124
This sad series of events represents two related phenomenons: 1)
society is fearful of AIDS, and this fear, combined with ignorance about
the disease and modes of transmission, generates bigotry and prejudice
toward victims of the disease, and 2) this prevalent, though regrettable,
response by society to AIDS and its victims strips all incentive to disclose
from an. HIV-infected HCW who might otherwise have disclosed his
disease.12s "AIDS brings with it a special stigma."' 126 Why would anyone
voluntarily subject themselves to this stigma? The answer is they un-
derstandably will not.' This lack of incentive was acknowledged in
Estate of Behringer:
[T]here must be a way to free physicians, in the pursuit of their
healing vocation, from possible contamination by self-interest or
self-protection concerns which would inhibit their independent
medical judgments for the well-being of their ... patients. There
are principles of law that guard against the concern for self-
interest, by including in the decision-making process the most
critical participant-the patient.12
124. Id. at 1256-57.
125. Ironically, it was public fear which prompted the hospital in the Estate of Behringer
case to adopt a special informed consent form which required disclosure of a physician's
HIV prior to surgery because of the potential damage to the hospital's reputation and
potential litigation. Id. at 1257.
126. Id. at 1269. A few examples of the hysterical public reaction to AIDS were
provided by the court:
removal of a teacher with AIDS from teaching duties; refusal to rent an
apartment to male homosexuals for fear of AIDS; firebombing of the home of
hemophiliac children who tested positive for AIDS; refusal by doctors and
[HCWs] to treat people with or suspected of having AIDS; refusal of co-workers
of an AIDS victim to use a truck used by the victim; filing of a charge of
attempted murder against an AIDS victim who spat at police; requiring an
AIDS victim to wear a mask in a courtroom; denial to children with AIDS of
access to schools; threatening to evict a physician who treated homosexuals;
boycotting of a public school after a child with AIDS was allowed to attend;
firing of homosexuals who displayed cold symptoms or rashes; refusal of par-
amedics to treat a heart attack victim for fear he had AIDS; refusal by police
to drive an AIDS victim to the hospital; police demands for rubber masks and
gloves when dealing with gays; refusal to hire Haitians; and urging of funeral
directors not to embalm the bodies of AIDS victims.
Id. at 1272 (citing Doe v. Barrington, 729 F.Supp. 376, 384 n.8 (D.N.J. 1990)).
127. This was acknowledged in explanation for the lack of information regarding the
number of dental workers with AIDS: "persons who know that they are HIV-infected
or who have non-occupational risks may not volunteer to be tested." Ciesielski, M.D. et
al., supra note I, at 44.
128. Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr. at Princeton. 592 A,2d 1251, 1278 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991).
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This lack of any incentive for voluntary disclosure makes it absolutely
imperative that courts, if not Congress, recognize a legal duty on the
part of HCWs to disclose their HIV infection.
VI. THE NEED FOR ROUTINE TESTING OF HCWs
Since the duty and the need for disclosure have been established,
this author believes that HCWs should undergo routine testing in order
to be capable of disclosing. Full disclosure of the risks involved in a
given procedure is impossible unless a HCW knows, with as much
certainty as possible, whether he is capable of transmitting HIV to the
patient. The court in Estate of Behringer specifically refused to address
this issue,'29 implying that it is indeed an issue raised as soon as one
finds there is a duty to disclose. It is true that one cannot disclose
what he does not know; however, because one does not have to know
he is infected with HIV in order to transmit it, and because one is
probably more likely to transmit HIV if he is unaware of his infection
(due to his engaging in activities that he would not otherwise engage
in), the duty to disclose should include the duty to be tested.
Serious consequences would result if the duty imposed upon HCWs
to disclose their HIV infection did not require them to routinely test
for its presence. This in effect would be rewarding ignorance. HCWs
would be encouraged not to test even if they thought they might be
infected. The impediments to voluntary disclosure discussed earlier are
magnified with regard to testing. Those who might have voluntarily
tested for their own benefit when not required to disclose the information
to patients would be deterred from doing so for fear of receiving positive
test results which would have to be disclosed and which would likely
destroy their careers. Therefore, the imposition of a duty to disclose
without the correlative duty to undergo routine testing would, in all
likelihood, do more harm than good.
A. Balancing the Costs and Benefits
Perhaps the most rational way to make any decision is to balance
the costs and benefits. What are the benefits of requiring HCWs to
routinely test for HIV and to disclose positive results to their patients?
The most obvious benefit would be to help prevent the spread of AIDS.
Additionally, as was suggested by the CDC with regard to testing hos-
pitalized patients,'30 the HCW would become aware of the existence of
HIV much earlier through routine testing. Rather than only discovering
129. "This case does not involve nor will this court decide the issue of mandatory
screening of physicians for HIV." Id. at 1279 n.18.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 46-48.
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HIV once opportunistic diseases indicating AIDS have forced the HCW
to seek treatment, as was the case with the surgeon in Estate of Beh-
ringer, the HCW would be able to seek immediate treatment at. the
earliest stages of the disease. Besides these personal benefits (which were
supposed to sell the idea to hospitalized patients without more), incredible
benefits would be gained by patients treated by the HCW. Since the
mean latency period for the development of AIDS after HIV infection
is five years, far fewer patients would be exposed to the risk of con-
tracting the disease if the HCW discovered his disease through routine
testing immediately after infection.' 3'
Further, as noted by the court in Estate of Behringer, the cumulative
risk of exposure in the health care setting is far higher when a HCW
is infected with HIV than when a patient is infected with HIV. The
patient will have relatively few invasive procedures performed while the
infected HCW is likely to perform numerous invasive procedures even
if his career is cut short by the virus. 32 Calculations suggest that the
risk of a HCW contracting HIV in a single surgery from an HIV-
infected patient is remote-from 1/130,000 to 1/4500. Assuming that
the risk of any one of an HIV-infected HCW's patients contracting the
virus from the surgeon is exceedingly low-l/130,000, the risk that one
of his patients will become infected becomes higher the more operations
he performs- 1/l,300 with 100 operations or 1/126 with 500 opera-
tions. "' Finally, without routine testing, the HCW is not likely to
discover his disease until he suffers from AIDS which is more easily
transmissible than HIV. 34
Another benefit to be derived from testing and disclosure is a
reduction in the injuries suffered by patients who undergo invasive
procedures by a HCW infected with HIV. As the court in Estate of
Behringer recognized (while the court in Rossi did not), the risk to
patients in such a situation goes beyond the possibility of dying as a
result of contracting AIDS. It also includes the extensive testing which
patients must undergo after exposure to the blood of a HCW.
Apparently, the medical industry has balanced the risk of the patient
having to undergo extensive testing and lifestyle changes, contracting
HIV and dying, with the cost of a HCW having to undergo routine
testing, disclose positive results to patients and possibly lose his career.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 30-31, describing the two latency periods
involved between HIV infection and the development of AIDS.
132. Estate of Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1280 (citing Larry Gostin, Hospitals, Health
Care Professionals, and AIDS: The "Right to Know" the Health Status of Professionals
and Patients, 48 Md. L. Rev. 12 (1989)).
133. Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr. at Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251, 1280 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991) (citing Gostin, supra note 132).
134. Id. at 1267.
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Not surprisingly, the medical industry has determined that "[tihe current
assessment of the risk that infected HCWs will transmit HIV ... to
patients during exposure-prone procedures does not support the diversion
of resources that would be required to implement mandatory testing
programs.""' Thus, the current CDC recommendations suggest that "if
an incident occurs during an invasive procedure that results in exposure
of a patient to the blood of an HCW, the patient should be informed
of the incident, and previous recommendations for management of such
exposures should be followed.""11 6 One cannot help but empathize with
the patient who responds with a resounding, "Now you tell me!!" What
could be more frustrating than learning after the fact that you have
been exposed to HIV when, if only you had been informed in advance,
you could have made a decision to avoid the risk? Yet, this is the
current recommended practice.
Shouldn't courts, if not Congress, be striking the balance between
the risks to patients and the costs to the medical industry rather than
the medical industry itself? It seems courts may be beginning to reclaim
that responsibility. In In Re: Milton S. Hershey Medical Center of the
Pennsylvania State University,' a case following Estate of Behringer
and citing it with approval, Dr. Doe was accidentally cut by the attending
physician during an invasive procedure. The following day, Dr. Doe
voluntarily submitted to a blood test for HIV, and the results were
positive. Dr. Doe took a voluntary leave of absence. Hershey Medical
Center conducted an investigation and identified 279 patients who had
been involved to some degree with Dr. Doe during their medical treat-
ment. Harrisburg Hospital, also a party to the litigation, did the same
and found 168 patients who had been in contact with Dr. Doe during
his joint residency."s
The trial court issued an order allowing limited disclosure of Dr.
Doe's HIV status, and the hospitals proceeded to inform the patients
of the doctor's status without revealing his name. The doctor appealed.
The appellate court was faced with the issue of whether the hospitals
sustained their burden of proving a "compelling need" for disclosing
Dr. Doe's HIV status considering the strong proscriptions against dis-
closure contained in The Confidentiality of HIV-Related Information
135. See supra text accompanying note 52.
136. Estate of Behringer, 592 A.2d at 1265 (citing Ctrs. for Disease Control, Recom-
mendations for Preventing Transmission of Infection with Human T-Lymphotropic Virus
Type Ill/Lymphadenopathy-Associated Virus during Invasive Procedures, 35 Morbidity
and Mortality Weekly Report 221-23 (1986)).
137. 595 A.2d 1290 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
138. The extent of the contact Dr. Doe had with the patients was not made part of
the record. Id. at 1291.
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Act adopted by the Pennsylvania Legislature.'3 9 That act provides in
part: "[T]he court shall weigh the need for disclosure against the privacy
interest of the individual and the public interests which may be harmed
by disclosure.'" 40
The court noted that although the chance of transmitting the HIV
virus during surgical procedures was slim-/48,000 according to one
commentator-the potential was nevertheless "present.' 4' However, the
court recognized:
When one begins to calculate how many individuals may be
subjected to the same risk by the same medical worker, multiplied
by the aggregate of infected health care professionals, the num-
bers become staggering. . . .Surely, it is no consolation to the
one or two individuals who become infected after innocently
consenting to medical care by an unhealthy doctor that they
were part of a rare statistic. 42
Despite Dr. Doe's argument that disclosure would discourage HCWs
from voluntarily seeking HIV testing, the court found that a compelling
need did exist and that disclosure had been proper. The court acknowl-
edged Dr. Doe's right to privacy but stated: "Dr. Doe's medical problem
was not merely his. It became a public concern the moment he picked
up a surgical instrument and became a part of a team involved in
invasive procedures." 43
The court addressed the necessity of informing patients so that they
might obtain testing and treatment and not inadvertently pass on the
virus to others, but the opinion does not address the impact this process
must have had on the 447 patients who were told after exposure that
they should undergo testing to see if they had been infected with a
deadly virus.
In the Kimberly Bergalis case,'" a Florida dentist had been diagnosed
with AIDS three months prior to the date he extracted two molars from
Kimberly.14 After the discovery of Kimberly's infection and its subse-
quent link to the dentist,'" 591 of the dentist's other patients were
139. Id. at 1294. The appellate court determined that the issue was not moot even
though the disclosure had already occurred because the scenario would undoubtedly be
repeated.
140. Id. at 1295 (citing 35 P.S. § 7608(c)).
141. Id. at 1296.
142. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
143. Id. at 1298.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 7-8.
145. Possible Transmission, supra note 7.
146. Four weeks after Kimberly's dental procedure, she sought treatment for a sore
throat. Twenty-four months after the procedure, she was diagnosed with PCP, an op-
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tested for HIV. Another 1,100 people who were identified as possible
patients and could be located were notified, and 141 of them were
tested. ,41
This in itself is a cost, regardless of whether the patients ultimately
test positively for HIV. Their lives are disrupted. They are forced to
undergo periodic testing for at least one year and suffer extreme anxiety
and mental anguish awaiiing the test results; they are counselled con-
cerning major lifestyle changes regarding sexual practices and conceiving
children. Just because this cost is paid by people with random identities
from all walks of life rather than by members of one profession capable
of uniting in a single voice does not mean that the cost is insignificant.
Why should all of these individuals be tested under such traumatic
conditions rather than requiring HCWs to be tested under routine con-
ditions? The HCWs certainly have better access to testing facilities than
the public at large and probably work in or near them on a daily basis.
That would be a factor indicating that on a per test basis, it would be
more efficient to test HCWs than members of the public at large. In
any event, something routine is obviously more palatable than something
unexpected, traumatic and life altering. Upon entering the profession
and deciding to perform invasive procedures, the HCW would be made
aware of the requirement of future routine testing. Otherwise, countless14
numbers of patients will be caught completely off guard and will have
to await test results that could mean the difference between life and
death.
portunistic disease, and tested positively for HIV. Kimberly fell into no risk group for
HIV infection, and both of her previous boyfriends tested seronegative. Sophisticated
comparisons were made of DNA extracted from blood samples of the dentist and Kimberly.
The "multifaceted analysis showed a similarity between the sequences from the patient
and the dentist that was comparable to what has been observed for cases that have been
epidemiologically linked (Los Alamos National Laboratory,, unpublished data)." Id. at
489-90.
147. Update, supra note 4.
148. Approximately 27 million operations are performed each year in United States
hospitals. Adelisa Panlilio, M.D., M.P.H. et al., Blood Contacts During Surgical Pro-
cedures, 265 JAMA 1533 (1991).
Defendant's expert in Estate of Behringer stated that "[als a practical matter,
surgeons incur needle sticks and other cuts in the operating room on a regular basis, and
the wearing of surgical gloves does not protect a surgeon from needle sticks or bleeding
into the patient's surgical wound or oral cavity." Estate of Behringer v. Medical Ctr. at
Princeton, 592 A.2d 1251, 1265 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1991). "Studies indicate that
a surgeon will cut a glove in approximately one out of every four cases, and probably
sustain a significant skin cut in one out of every forty cases." Id. at 1279.
Of course, the number of HCWs performing these operations who are infected with
HIV is not known. Therefore, according to current practice, the number of patients who
are exposed to an HIV infected HCW's blood during an invasive procedure will not be
known until after the accident.
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What are the costs associated with requiring testing and disclosure?
Realistically, in most cases, the practice of the doctor who discloses that
he is HIV-positive will be destroyed. That is the real cost involved in
requiring an HIV-infected HCW to disclose his condition to patients.
In fact, the Estate of Behringer court recognized that this cost should
be weighed against the value derived from the HIV-infected HCW per-
forming invasive procedures. The court noted that "[wihile society must
protect the availability of vital services, there is no need to protect the
services of any one provider.' 4 9
However, a separate analysis is required in order to justify the costs
involved in mandatory testing of HCWs. Taking the court's analysis50
a step further to mandatory testing of HCWs requires consideration of
three elements:
(a) The social value which the law attaches to the interest which
is to be advanced or protected by the conduct.
As determined in Estate of Behringer, "[the law places a very high
value on a patient's safety and well-being."'' The safety and well-being
of patients (including the HCWs who become patients as a result of
positive HIV test results) would be promoted by mandatory testing
because HIV infection in HCWs would be discovered much earlier
through routine testing, and, therefore, less patients would be at risk
of exposure. In addition, routine testing would drastically reduce the
risk of HIV being spread from HCW-to-patient and would, therefore,
be a valuable weapon against a disease of epidemic proportions. Perhaps
most importantly, routine testing would make it possible to assess the
risk of HCW-to-patient transmission which is certainly more prudent
than just assuming the risk is low. As a result, routine testing would
maintain and perhaps bolster society's confidence in the medical pro-
fession.
(b) The extent of the chance that this interest will be advanced
or protected by the particular course of conduct.
The extent of the chance that these interests would be advanced by
routine testing is very high, though as yet undeterminable. Recall that -
with routine testing, HIV infection would be discovered in ninety-five
percent of cases within six months' of the HCW's infection." ' Once
HIV is discovered in a HCW, patients would be informed of the HCW's
149. Estate of Eehringer, 592 A.2d at 1281 (citing Gordon Keyes, Health-Care Profes-
sionals with AIDS: The Risk of Transmission Balanced Against the Interests of Profes-
sionals and Institutions, 16 J.C. & U.L. 589. 603-04 n.114 (1990).
150. The court followed Keyes' suggestion which utilizes the risk-benefit analysis found
in Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 293 (a)-(c) (1965). Estate of Behringer, 592 A.2d at
1281.
151. 592 A.2d at 1281.
152. See supra text accompanying note 30.
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condition before that HCW performed invasive procedures and poten-
tially exposed the patient to the virus. Because a patient would obviously
opt against surgery by an HIV-infected HCW, patients would no longer
be exposed to HCWs' HIV during the prolonged latency period between
the time a HCW is seropositive and the time he develops opportunistic
diseases which would otherwise alert the HCW to seek treatment and
discover his condition. Thus, routine testing would greatly advance and
protect the interests described in paragraph (a).
(c) The extent of the chance that such interest can be adequately
advanced or protected by another and less dangerous course of
conduct. 1S3
The only other possible course of conduct that might be less costly
than routine testing that this author can suggest would be to impose a
reasonable man based standard for HIV testing. Instead of requiring
mandatory testing for all HCWs who perform invasive procedures, the
duty would require a HCW to be tested who reasonably believed himself
to be at risk of carrying HIV based on factors such as lifestyle, behavior
and perhaps exposure to HIV-infected patients.
There are, however, several problems with this alternative. Such a
duty would not be that different from the "case-by-case" policy currently
in effect. As was previously discussed, all members of the health care
industry could be considered at high risk for contracting HIV. This is
illustrated in the fact that one of the factors considered in narrowing
the source of Kimberly Bergalis' infection was that she had never "been
employed in a health-care or other setting where she could have been
exposed to HIV-infected blood or other body fluids.'1 4 Another problem
with this alternative is that the "unreasonable person" might be infected
with HIV and find that potential liability is not enough incentive to
test for and disclose the positive results. Therefore, to select individuals
from the group of HCWs based on factors personal to them, would
probably not advance the interest of blocking the spread of the virus
from HCWs-to-patients.
Additionally, it would not promote confidence in the medical pro-
fession because the profession would not be taking every precaution
available to it in order to protect its patients. Further, the circle of
transmission would not have been severed as cleanly as possible, and
therefore, the medical profession would be placing the livelihood of its
members above the need to stop the spread of AIDS. Thus, it appears
that there is no less dangerous alternative course of conduct which would
adequately advance the interests and protections afforded by routine,
mandatory testing.
153. Id.
154. Possible Transmission, supra note 7.
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Therefore, since the interests are high, the chance of advancing and
protecting them are high, and no adequate alternatives which are less
dangerous exist, one can conclude that the benefits of mandatory testing
of HCWs outweigh the costs.
VII. SCOPE OF THE DUTY
If a duty to test and disclose is imposed on HCWs, what are its
parameters?
A. Who Owes the Duty?
As has been implicit throughout this article, only those HCWs who
perform invasive procedures would be subject to the duty to test and
disclose. The duty to test and disclose derives from the duty to obtain
informed consent; however, there may be HCWs who have the duty to
obtain informed consent but who do not perform invasive procedures.
Those HCWs would not be required to test and disclose. There are also
those in the medical profession who do not owe the duty to obtain
informed consent, such as a radiologist whose duty is to read X-ray
film and write a report to the treating physician." Such a person would
not owe the duty to test and disclose.
The degree of invasiveness of the procedures performed by a par-
ticular HCW, however, should not determine whether or not the HCW
must undergo routine HIV testing and disclose positive results; rather,
the degree of invasiveness should be used to set the frequency with
which those routine tests must be performed. For example, an oral
surgeon, who performs highly invasive procedures in the mucous mem-
brane area which is highly susceptible to transmission of HIV, or an
obstetrician, who performs many procedures "by feel" which increases
the likelihood of nicks or cuts, should probably be tested more frequently
than a general practitioner who occasionally administers injections.
Several cases have addressed the scope of the duty to obtain informed
consent and thus provide parameters for the duty to test and disclose.
In Nisenholtz v. Mount Sinai Hospital,"16 the New York Supreme Court
held that a physician who merely refers a patient to another doctor
does not become liable if the second doctor performs surgery without
obtaining informed consent.
In Lincoln v. Gupta, s7 a Michigan appellate court held that a
hospital did not owe a duty to obtain informed consent of a patient.
Rather, it was the doctor's duty to inform the patient of risks associated
155. Cf. Townsend v. Turk, 266 Cal. Rptr. 821 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
156. 483 N.Y.S.2d 568 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
157. 370 N.W.2d 312 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).
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with the procedure and any breach of that duty was committed by the
doctor rather than the hospital. Perhaps in the context of transmission
of HIV, however, the hospital would be liable if it did not have pro-
cedures established for the testing of HCWs and for facilitating the
disclosure of positive results (such as a special informed consent form
used by the hospital in Estate of Behringer).
B. To Whom is the Duty Owed?
To whom the duty is owed may be less easily determined. At what
point must the HIV-infected HCW disclose his infection to a patient-
prior to establishing the HCW-patient relationship or simply prior to
performing any invasive procedures? The duty to test comes into existence
when the HCW undertakes to perform invasive procedures; that duty
is not patient specific. However, the duty to disclose HIV infection in
order to obtain informed consent is patient specific. Thus, there would
probably be situations where the HCW has tested positively for HIV
but does not need to disclose the results to a particular patient because
the HCW is not performing an invasive procedure on that patient.
What about co-workers and employers? As a practical matter, the
employer may be the one conducting the testing and monitoring the
results in which case it would know without disclosure by the HCW.
As for co-workers, the duty owed them is beyond the scope of this
article but is an issue which must be considered.'
What about professional liability insurance carriers? Perhaps prem-
iums would be reduced for those who are not HIV-positive rather than
having the cost of possible HCW-to-patient transmission spread across
all HCWs.
VIII. POSSIBLE METHODS FOR REDUCING THE BURDEN
In balancing the costs and benefits of imposing a duty to test and
disclose, one must recognize significant costs. The administrative costs
of routinely testing HCWs will be offset long term, to some extent, by
the reduction in the number of patients who would have to be tested
after an accident occurs. Those costs are also justified by the extreme
anguish of those patients who are called to be tested after the fact.
Another cost generated by the imposition of such a duty is the
destruction of the career of a valued member of the medical profession.
Once a HCW tests positively for HIV and has to disclose those results
158. For a full discussion of hospital liability for the tranmission of AIDS to patients
or among co-workers, see Comment, Hospitals and AIDS Discrimination: Applicability
of Federal Discrimination Laws to HCWs and Staff Physicians, 6 J. Contemp. Health
L. & Pol'y 193 (1990).
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to patients, his career virtually comes to a halt. 59 Perhaps a way of
reducing the impact of this inevitable consequence would be to pay
HIV-infected HCWs a higher salary to work with AIDS patients. Free
enterprise has already required that HCWs (HIV infected or not) who
treat AIDS patients be paid a premium.
Several benefits would be derived from giving employment oppor-
tunities in AIDS treatment and research facilities to HIV-infected HCWs
first. The HCWs would benefit because they would be able to enjoy
an increased salary without assuming an additional risk of contracting
HIV as do HCWs who are not infected with HIV. That would help
them with the increased medical costs associated with HIV. They would
also realize a sense of reward and vitality from being part of the battle
against the progression of AIDS. The patients suffering from AIDS
would benefit because an HIV-infected HCW would undoubtedly be
more understanding and create a warmer environment than would a
HCW who is understandably fearful of contracting the patients' disease.
IX. CONCLUSION-RESOLVINO UNCERTAINTY IN FAVOR OF DISCLOSURE
"AIDS is not a disease that is, or that should be taken lightly by
our society. Rather, many view it as a problem of epidemic proportion
that knows no bounds and discriminates against no one."'16 If this is
true, which it certainly seems to be, what is the role of the medical
profession in light of this epidemic? Is it just another business enterprise
which provides employment opportunities for the highly skilled and
specially trained? Or is its role to promote, preserve, protect, and restore
public health? One must hope it is the latter, and if it is, an HCW's
infection with HIV becomes a public concern the moment he picks up
a medical instrument and becomes part of a team involved in invasive
procedures.'
Just as a football star who irreparably injures his knee can no longer
lead his team to victory, a HCW who contracts a deadly disease can
no longer protect the health of a patient (who is not HIV positive) by
performing invasive procedures. Patients are entitled to expect that their
HCWs will not increase their exposure to the risk of contracting an
infectious disease.'6 2 The guardian of this expectation is the doctrine of
medical informed consent which "is based on the principle that every
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
what shall be done to his or her own body."' 63
159. See supra text accompanying notes 123-24.
160. In Re: Milton S. Hershey Medical Ctr. of the Pa. State Univ., 595 A.2d 1290,
1301 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
161. See supra text accompanying note 143.
162. See supra text accompanying note 53.
163. See supra note 89.
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Even though the risk of HCW-to-patient transmission is arguably
small, the stakes are extremely high and the risk, after all, is the patient's.
Assessment of the importance of the risk cannot belong to anyone but
the patient, and that assessment cannot be made without routine testing
of HCWs and disclosure of positive results to patients. Though the risk
is arguably small, its degree is terribly uncertain.'" Simply because we
cannot calculate the risk with accuracy should not provide grounds to
assume it away. Perhaps if we instituted mandatory testing we would
find that the risk is much greater than we once thought. There is no
way to know until we know how many HCWs in fact are infected with
HIV. With the rate that this disease has spread and the recent first
known death caused by HCW-to-patient transmission of HIV, shouldn't
we resolve the uncertainty in favor of protecting health and preventing
further spread of the disease?
Ten years ago, we were shocked by the discovery of this incredible
disease. Years later, we were shocked to learn that not only homosexual
men and intravaneous drug users fell victims to the disease but so did
heterosexual "mainstream" Americans. In 1990, we were shocked by
the announcement that Kimberly Bergalis had contracted HIV from her
dentist. Is it logical for the medical profession to sit back on its knowl-
edge, comfortable with the notion that "there [is] little evidence of
transmission of the virus by HCWs, other than the case of a Florida
dentist"? 16'
This author suggests that this disease has permeated our society with
alarming speed and devastation and will shock us again. Perhaps it is
time to place obstacles in its path to prevent its only skilled combatant-
the medical profession-from becoming its unwitting co-conspirator.
Jane H. Barney
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